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Abstract
By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea of that a 
particular type of regime, what can be termed a “tacit security regime” has begun to emerge 
between Israel on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states on the other. It is a regime 
which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of 
collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and 
strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope and scale of this 
nascent tacit security regime, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of 
Washington, DC's regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining 
the political and strategic contours of Israel's relations with much of the Middle East.
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Car number plates rarely make national headlines. But in July 2015, a vehicle bearing a Saudi 
license  plate was spotted in the port of Jaffa prompting not inconsiderable discussion on 
social media across Israel and making the front page of several national  newspapers the next 
day. The owner of the car was indeed a Saudi who had crossed into Israel via Jordan to 
discuss a business venture with an Israeli Arab but irrespective of the commercial 
justification, it was the wider political symbolism of this sighting that carried most weight. As 
one Israeli journalist noted, “The nuclear agreement with Iran is starting to prove itself.” 
(“Car with Saudi license plates,” 2015) 
For Riyadh and other Gulf states, the nuclear deal struck between Tehran and the five  
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany (P5+1) in July 
2015 may have served the interests of the Western powers, but it has done little to curb Iran’s  
regional interests or indeed its longer term nuclear ambitions (Guzansky,  2015, p. 129; 
“Israel and the Arab world,” 2016). This view remains widely held in Israel too. Although 
some within the country’s military and security establishment welcomed the agreement, from 
2009 onwards successive centre right governments, led by Premier Binyamin Netanyahu, 
voiced their trenchant opposition to any deal that would allow Iran to increase financial aid to 
its regional proxies while maintaining a breakout capability within its nuclear program, albeit 
one diminished by the terms of the agreement (Jones, 2016). 
It also highlighted a wider issue for both Israel and Saudi Arabia: The extent to which 
Washington, DC appears unwilling or unable to exercise strategic leadership across the 
region, a leadership on which both Israel and the Gulf states had based  their regional security 
strategies (Simon &  Stevenson, 2015, pp.2-10). This in turn poses a profound  question: 
How can we conceptualize the scope and intensity of relations  between Israel and the Arab 
Gulf states that have emerged since 2009? This article puts forward the argument that at the 
very least, such relations are now more pronounced and vibrant than hitherto realized: they 
have now evolved into what we define as a “tacit security  regime” (TSR) which, while based 
on hard power interests, does not preclude competition or co-operation in other areas between 
the actors involved.  
The very idea of what constitutes a TSR remains contested; geo-strategic interests as 
well as ideational factors determine the intimacy or otherwise of relations between the actors 
involved. Even so, a consensus is clearly discernible around how adversaries – who would  
otherwise normally eschew more formal means of diplomatic exchange – manage their 
relations through a series of informal agreements and understandings and where,   despite 
being unwritten and not codified, rules and boundaries in pursuit of wider shared interests or 
readily understood. Equally, such regimes do not have to privilege normative principles 
usually associated with international regime theories much beyond the maintenance  of 
national security to be effective.  To this end, the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states is 
very much  a “work in progress,” its resilience in meeting contemporary security challenges 
being a function of shared perceptions of  the threat presented by Iran,  rather than a 
clandestine expression of a deeper intimacy beyond strategic gain.  
The first part of this article offers an overview of security regimes more generally 
before outlining the genesis of the TSR in the extant literature. Building on this literature, we 
posit an analytical framework that while emphasizing the primacy of Realpolitik in the 
emergence of such regimes, appreciates how ideational concerns determine the scope and 
trajectory of Israel’s ties with the Gulf states. The second part   offers contextual background 
on the emergence of the TSR; the third offers a more detailed application of the framework 
by examining Israel’s ties with several Gulf states but with a particular emphasis upon Saudi 
Arabia. Finally, we conclude by examining the wider significance of the TSR as a recognition 
and reflection of Washington’s regional retrenchment. More broadly, our conception of  the 
TSR has an undoubted utility beyond the Middle East. It can inform and illuminate patterns 
of state behavior between erstwhile protagonists in other parts of the world facing security 
challenges that have,  hitherto, been arbitrated through the diplomatic and military influence 
of the United States.       
 
From Security Regimes to TSRs  
 Unlike liberal institutional approaches that regard international regimes as largely 
collaborative mechanisms between allies  designed to mitigate the worst excesses of the 
security dilemma while producing  a normative public good,  security regimes, with their 
emphasis upon hard power, are underpinned by shared perceptions of  threats to be countered 
and interests to be realized. As that doyen of regime theory, Stephen Krasner, would most 
likely recognize, security regimes of this type remain the progeny of the classic security 
dilemma. (Krasner, 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997, pp. 8-22.) 
 Yet  much of the literature surrounding the establishment of security regimes still 
emphasizes the formal rules to be adhered to, often within an agreed institutional setting that 
eventually gives rise to formal alliances. In his examination of the Concert of Europe that 
broadly secured European peace for almost a century following the Napoleonic wars, Robert 
Jervis highlighted the shared understandings and the desire  to maintain the status quo among 
the great European powers. His typology embraced (1)  a mutual recognition of vital 
interests; (2) a propensity for longer term strategic gain brought about by restraint  over 
immediate  advantage; (3) that the actual concert did not conform to the actual  distribution  
of power  capabilities but rather conformed to agreed principles governing state behavior. 
From this, Jervis concluded that security regimes were configured around principles, rules 
and norms that engendered mutual reciprocity and restraint (Jervis, 1985, pp. 58-79). 
   At first glance, identifying any security regime  in the Middle East demonstrating 
adherence to any of the three characteristics outlined by Jervis is not easy. Despite its relative 
longevity, the GCC has hardly conformed to agreed principles governing security co-
operation.  Most  notably, the attempt in 1991 to establish a peninsula force designed to deter 
any future Iraqi aggression – the so-called Damascus Declaration – proved stillborn: 
Suspicion of Saudi dominance, coupled with fears that the presence of Syrian and Egyptian 
forces  as part of the force could prove destabilizing to the monarchies of the Gulf were 
enough to scupper the initiative. But more nuanced understandings of security regimes and 
how they  might operate within the context of the Middle East have been developed 
elsewhere.  
  Three decades ago and building on the work of Jervis, Stein (1985) looked to apply 
the concept of a security regime to understanding the  broad contours of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. She claimed that zero-sum competition no-longer defined this conflict; rather, the 
interests of Israel and its Arab neighbors were neither “wholly competitive or compatible,” 
leading to a process of conflict management where all sides recognized the rules of a game 
and the underlying principle of reciprocity involved. For Inbar and Sandler (1995, pp. 43-45) 
however, reciprocity alone was insufficient to account for the relative stability of ties between 
Israel  and its Arab neighbors. Stein, they argued, underestimated  the role that deterrence 
played in the relationship and in particular, through its exercise of overwhelming military 
power, the extent to which Israel saw its regional-strategic position and interests as 
configured around maintaining this status quo. This led them to argue that Israel’s relations 
with the wider Arab world were best  defined as a laissez faire security regime:  order was 
maintained through the distribution of military power which privileged Israel  and the 
emergence of a decentralized deterrence relationship. This ensured the acceptance, however 
reluctant, by other actors of the clear limitations of using force to change the regional 
configuration of power. Finally, Inbar and Sandler (1995, pp. 43-45) concluded that such 
laissez faire regimes lack the institutionalization and formal concordance that defined the 
construct of  security regimes as defined by Jervis; even so, they are no less real for that.  
The characterization of security regimes as laissez faire is, however,  problematic. 
The primacy placed on deterrence as the dominant condition of the regime tells as very little 
about the level and type of interaction between the actors involved. If the  laissez faire regime 
is defined by a search for security from one another rather than with one another, it remains 
limited concerning other  types and forms of  interaction, notably co-operative behavior, that  
underpins  constructs of a security regime.  While accepting that rules can be informal and 
norms implied, they remain integral to a regime even if deterrence remains the bedrock of 
state interaction. Moreover, by emphasizing the idea of the status quo,  how regional security 
regimes change and adapt remains unclear, not least when  laissez faire  regimes built on the 
basis of deterrence are faced by  broader existential threats.  
The need therefore to understand the actual interaction between erstwhile protagonists 
is crucial to embedding our understanding of a security regime as more than just a progeny of  
deterrence. The work  of Klieman (1995) in relation to Israel’s ties with Jordan  prior to the 
signing of the peace treaty in 1994 offers a more appropriate conceptual point of departure. 
Acknowledging, like Inbar and Sandler, that the study of international regimes often eschews 
“the traditionally normative, legalistic-formulistic and institutional focus on treaty alliances, 
the United Nations and multilateral organisations,”  Klieman (1995) placed the emphasis 
upon those areas of co-operation where “actor expectations converge” (p.127).  
 Taking this as his point of departure, Klieman went on to develop the idea of a “tacit” 
international security regime, a paradigm he described as “non-superpower, non-hegemonic, 
non-Western, non-contractual and non-institutionalised cooperation.” (Klieman, 1995, p. 
129)     
 [T]he Israel-Jordan regime, although not entirely “unspoken or wordless,” does arise 
 and operate without any “express contract”. The regime does possess the requisite 
 collection of rights and rules, however these are unwritten and uncodified.…..Signals 
 and subtleties  are exchanged more often than not behind the scenes, between the 
 lines, and under the table, via back channels involving indirect but also direct 
 communication [emphasis added]. (Klieman, 1995, p.130) 
 
 While the maintenance of  national security understood in its hierarchical sense  
remains the prime goal of such a regime, it is not the only “good” to be realized from the 
regime; neither, importantly, does it preclude continued competition in a different realm, be it 
political or economic (Klieman, 1995, p. 130). There are however important caveats to be 
noted: Klieman’s TSR was configured around a bi-lateral relationship rather than multilateral 
ties with a range of actors. Does the model therefore capture the complexity of the various 
interactions among and between Israel and the Gulf states? Secondly, the type  of regime that 
emerged between Israel and Jordan was aided by a shared land border which enabled other  
“goods” to be realized beyond mitigating the mutual concerns regarding Palestinian 
nationalism. To what extent therefore is the durability of the regime a function of 
geographical proximity? Thirdly, can a TSR, particularly in a globalized age, have enduring 
appeal if it remains configured around the maintenance primarily of one  “good,” that is the 
containment of  Iran, rather than a more nuanced understanding of wider security concerns 
that could  range from  environmental degradation through to energy security?   
We note that that the contours of such a regime are certainly apparent in at least some 
facets of relations between Israel and the Gulf states but with one important innovation: 
While the idea of the “unwritten”  and the “uncodified” defined the clandestine nature of 
Klieman’s TSR, the construct of the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states allows for 
multiple modes of engagement – some of it open – between the actors involved. As such, our 
construct of the TSR as it applies to Israel and the Gulf states is defined by the following: 
That  geographical proximity need not determine the scope and varying  intensity of the 
modes and means of exchange – be they strategic, political, or economic – between the actors 
involved. That the regime itself is a function of shared perception of threat – in this case Iran 
– rather than primarily geared towards managing relations as Inbar and Sandler (1995) noted 
between the states themselves. This highlights ongoing competition in other areas, co-
operation in others  but with the important caveat that the regime itself mitigates excess 
competition to ensure the core aim of the regime is realized: the containment of Iran. Actors 
involved  in the TSR recognize ideational , even emotive factors derived from domestic 
legitimacy  constrain moves towards more progressive ties, an important correction perhaps 
to the dominance hitherto exercised by classical Realist accounts  regarding the structural 
causation of  security regimes across the international system.That the intimacy of the regime 
reflects subjective perceptions surrounding  great power commitment to the security of  the 
actors involved, the United States in particular. That other modes and means of exchange, 
while limited, do mark relations between the erstwhile protagonists, not least in areas of 
mutual business and commercial interest (Ravid, 2016a; “Israeli official praises Saudi 
King,”).That the regime allows for open yet subtle signals to be exchanged that over time 
engenders public acceptance of more substantive dialogue and  the exchange of strategic  and 
political goods. This allows the regime to change and adopt as ideational context dictates: It 
is not static. It is the exploration and substantive analysis of these  themes  that in an 
increasingly fragmented Middle East, highlight the  growing importance of security regimes 
in general, and the TSRs in particular as appropriate frameworks  in understanding  wider 
shifts in the regional dispensation of power.  
 
Israel and the Gulf states: Understanding the Context of the TSR   
 
 That Israel has ties with a variety of actors – both state and non-state -  across the 
Middle East spanning several decades is no secret.; nor has geographical distance proved an 
insurmountable impediment to these ties. Faced with the animus of a largely hostile Arab and 
Muslim Middle East upon its establishment, Israel looked to a series of clandestine ties with 
minority groups such as the Kurds  in  northern Iraq and Christian tribes in Southern Sudan, 
but also with state actors – most notably  Ethiopia, Turkey and Iran – as a means of 
weakening the idea of a united Arab front  against the nascent Jewish state. The Torat 
Ha’peripheria or Periphery Doctrine was the brainchild of Israel’s first Prime Minister, 
David Ben Gurion, and met with considerable success (but also tragedy in the case of 
Lebanon) as Israel looked to secure its position as a permanent fixture among the wider 
constellation of Middle East States (Alpher,  2015, pp. 38-39). 
   Throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s however such contacts (including  those of 
a clandestine nature) appear to  have been the exception rather than the rule. Israel’s invasion 
of Lebanon in June 1982 and the widespread opprobrium it faced from across the Arab world 
followed by the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, underscored  an 
entrenched regional antipathy towards Jerusalem (Podeh, 2015,pp157-168). Indeed, these 
events appeared to condemn  the so called Fahd plan – named after the then Saudi  Crown 
Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud and launched in June 1981 – before it could  gain any 
credible traction among  the regional actors. Its significance was however more subtle: while 
it championed the right of return of Palestinian refugees, full Israeli withdrawal from  all the 
territories captured in the June 1967 war and the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state, 
it did recognize, albeit implicitly, that Israel was part of the Middle East state system and 
could  co-exist peacefully with its neighbors. (Kostiner, 2009, pp. 417-429). 
 For successive Israeli governments however, the insistence by Arab interlocutors  on 
the right of return as a pre-requisite for negotiations, rather than as an issue to be decided in 
any wider regional peace  talks has remained a red-line: Should that right be realized, 
demographics alone would dictate the end of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state. Pre-
occupied with the bloody morass of the Iran-Iraq war and faced with the utter rejection by 
Damascus of any opening to the “Zionist entity,” the Fahd plan soon fell into abeyance.  
Subsequent attempts to revise the plan came to naught: it was only under the auspices of the  
historic Madrid Peace Conference convened in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War  and 
the signing in September 1993 of the Oslo Accords that any  progress was made in 
developing more tangible ties between Israel and the Gulf states (Rosman-Stollman, 2006).  
In the hope if not expectation that the accords would  portend a wider deal between Israel and 
the PLO resulting  in full statehood for the Palestinians, most Gulf states lifted the secondary 
boycott against Israel. This had prevented companies operating across the region doing 
business with the Jewish state. For Jerusalem the lifting of the secondary boycott was a 
landmark achievement: It allowed substantial capital investment to flow in to  Israel from a 
range of multinational companies eager to  exploit spin-offs  from its high-technology 
military-industrial base and the mass volume of highly educated immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union (Reed, 2015). 
 By 1996, Israel had established two trade missions to Muscat and Doha while the late 
Yossi Sarid, as Minister for Environment in the government of Yitzhak Rabin, headed an 
official Israeli delegation to Bahrain in 1994 as part of a wider multilateral accord on 
environmental co-operation that developed out  of the Madrid Peace Conference three years 
earlier.  For  a short period of time, the Oslo process opened a window on the possibility of 
new regional horizons for Israel, a window whose latch had been the Israel’s ties with the 
Palestinians. As Sarid reported back to the Knesset,
 
 The Bahraini foreign minister asked me to convey a message of peace to the people of 
 Israel, his determination and desire to see the peace process succeed, and to establish 
 economic co-operation with Israel. He viewed the meeting (of the environmental 
 working group) as the first in a number of stages that would lead to closer relations 
 between the two countries. (Goren, 2015) 
 
The promise that these low level ties might translate into more tangible diplomatic 
assets  soon foundered on the increasingly fractious nature of Israel’s relationship with the 
Palestinians, culminating with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. Amid 
the carnage visited by Palestinian suicide bombers on Israel’s streets, and the inevitable 
human cost  of  retribution exacted by Israel against the various Palestinian militias, any  
hope of progressing ties with Qatar and Oman appeared stillborn. Muscat quietly  shut the 
Israeli trade mission in response to the violence although, the Qataris proved more resistant. 
It was only after sustained pressure from both Riyadh and Tehran who threatened to boycott a 
meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference then under the Chairmanship of the 
Qataris, that Doha somewhat reluctantly closed the Israeli office in November 2000. Still, as 
Uzi Rabi notes, the Qataris continued to hold a series of meetings with Israeli officials, 
including the then Israeli foreign ministers Shlomo Ben-Ami and Silvan Shalom in Geneva 
and Paris respectively (Rabi, 2009, pp. 451-452). 
The shared position of Tehran and Riyadh on this issue was as much to do with 
playing the card of anti-Israeli feeling in the wider court of Arab-Muslim opinion as it was 
from any sense of fidelity to the advancing the Palestinian cause.  Wider regional eddies 
related directly to the fallout from the attacks of 9/11 and later on, the 2003 Iraq war soon 
overshadowed the ongoing al-Aqsa intifada. The war and consequent insurgency that  
bedeviled attempts to resurrect anything resembling a coherent state in Iraq  created a vacuum  
increasingly  filled by sectarian interests backed by competing regional powers.  King 
Abdullah II of Jordan may have sounded alarmist when, in 2004, he expressed fears  of  an 
emerging  “Shi’i crescent,”  comprising both state and non-state actors that  now stretched  
from Tehran to Beirut; for the Gulf states however, the warning from the Hashemite monarch  
carried a keenly felt veracity (“The Shia Crescendo,” 2015). 
 This growing antipathy towards Iran and its sponsorship of its Shi’a surrogates 
among  the capitals of the Gulf  and with it a discernible shift in attitudes towards Israel  
surfaced most visibly during the 2006 Lebanon war. While mindful of the image of heroic  
resistance  against the Zionist aggressor that Hezbollah enjoyed across the Arab world, 
Riyadh made clear its displeasure with the rash actions of the al-Muqawama (the armed wing 
of  Hezbollah) that had precipitated the conflict. The Saudi government announcement 
condemning the “reckless adventurism” of  the movement and that such adventurism was 
liable to “bring ruination down on all the Arab states” came as an unpleasant surprise to the 
Hezbollah leadership amid the wider approbation it had hitherto enjoyed on the Arab street.  
(Harel & Issacharoff, 2008, p. 102).  
Partly because of fears of surrounding the recrudescence of Iranian inspired  influence 
across the Middle East, and partly because of lingering sensitivity to accusations that Saudi 
Arabia remained an incubator of extremism given the identity of 15 of the 19 hijackers on 
9/11, Riyadh had, even before the 2006 conflagration  looked to actively promote a more 
moderate image of the Wahhabi state across the world (Kostiner, 2005, pp. 353-354). By 
championing a peace initiative that looked to broker an agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians, Riyadh hoped to ameliorate these concerns and at the same time, shore up its 
influence among Sunni Arabs increasingly uneasy at the emerging dispensation of power in 
Iraq as well as Lebanon. The announcement of the Abdullah plan in February 2002, named 
after the then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, has therefore  to be seen in this 
context.  
The plan balanced full Arab recognition of the Jewish state against Israeli withdrawal 
from the territories captured and occupied following the June 1967 war. Some in Israel 
remained keen to explore the idea  but its appeal remained limited and perhaps even 
politically toxic amid the ever increasing bloodshed of the al-Aqsa intifada. Moreover, its 
inclusion of UN Resolution 194, championing  the right of return of Palestinian refugees,  
was seen by its critics  for what it really was: denial of  Israel’s  right to exist as a 
predominantly  Jewish dispensation (Teitelbaum, 2009). The plan was  greeted however  with 
diplomatic plaudits in the capitals of Europe and even informed the “Road Map,” the  
moribund peace initiative launched by President George W. Bush. Despite the consequent  
vicissitudes of Israeli-Palestinian relations including Jerusalem’s unilateral withdrawal from 
Gaza, the 2006 Lebanon war, the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 and  a series of  Israeli 
military operations into Gaza strip itself from 2008 onwards, what is now more widely 
known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API) has remained on the table. Writing in  The 
Washington Post in July 2009, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa of Bahrain  championed 
the API as the only means by which to mitigate  a conflict that “needlessly impoverishes 
Palestinians and endangers Israel’s security.” (Hamad Al-Khalifa, 2009) The article was 
significant for two reasons: the explicit recognition by an Arab state of Israel’s genuine 
security concerns expressed in an influential publication and secondly, the view that such an 
article, despite being authored by a leading member of the al-Khalifa dynasty, was most 
likely approved by Bahrain’s suzerainty, Saudi Arabia. 
As noted, such sentiment was indicative of a more benign attitude towards Israel that 
had begun to emerge following the Lebanon war. The Deputy Director of the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ya’acov Hadas-Handelsman, opined to his American  colleagues that 
Israel’s views of Iran, Syria, and Hamas were now shared by many of the Gulf states, with 
Tehran’s regional ambitions the root cause of much of the turmoil across the region. With 
Washington experiencing its own difficulties with Iranian backed Shi’a militias in Iraq, there 
is a sense that the Israeli was playing to the gallery. Even so, Hadas-Handelsman warned that 
a pervasive feeling among the Gulf capitals was that the United States appeared no longer 
able or willing to extend effective security guarantees to the Gulf states and as such, friendly 
ties with Tehran were not a choice but a necessity. Quoting an unnamed Gulf official in close 
contact with Jerusalem, the Israeli diplomat  went on to note that, “Our target [Iran] is mutual 
but we beg to differ on how to achieve it [countering its military power].” (Wikileaks, 2007) 
Having become pre-occupied with fighting two bloody military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the perception – if not the reality – that the United States was 
becoming increasingly wary (as well as weary) of further military commitments across the 
Middle East  appeared pervasive among the  Gulf states. These perceptions in turn  had begun 
to influence attitudes towards both Iran and Israel even before the onset of the Arab spring. 
Jerusalem was never to naïve enough to ascribe unity of purpose to the position of the Gulf 
states; Oman and Qatar in particular  remained outliers in their public endorsement of close 
ties with Tehran.  But behind closed doors, the Qataris were apparently convinced that only 
the threat of military action could curtail Tehran’s regional ambition and  nuclear program, 
the scope and scale of which Iran had only revealed under much duress from the international 
community (Eiran, 2015, p.63). Now, fear of unchecked Iranian intrigue  emboldened  by a 
nuclear program designed to underpin those self-same goals increased concern that 
Washington, DC  now looked to lessen its commitment to the security of the Gulf.  From 
2009 onwards Israel’s relations with individual member states of the GCC  emerged 
increasingly from the shadows and with it, the contours of a TSR whose realm was not 
contingent  on geographical proximity  or crucially,  the development of normative principles 
designed to regulate the behavior of the actors involved.  
 
The Contours of the Tacit Security Regime  
 The dominant variable that has pushed the Gulf states and Israel towards a TSR  was a 
shared perception of Iran’s growing regional power  and, as our framework notes,  the 
primary importance of protecting one “good” – national security – above all else.   Ideational 
constraints remain important but the  contours of the  TSR that  now emerged demonstrated 
how “unwritten and uncodified” rules begun to shape the interactions of the actors involved. 
These relations were extensive,  sometimes hidden but occasionally subjected to a wider 
regional gaze.  
  While perception of  the level of threat  facing the Gulf states was by no  means 
uniform, historical antipathies, inter-regional rivalries and geographical proximity to Iran 
proved  important variables. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was acutely aware of 
growing unease among the Gulf states over what they saw as an increased willingness on the 
part of the United States to engage with Iran. At a time when the incumbent President in 
Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was hardly expressing his devotion to an American-Iranian 
rapprochement, this new trajectory  in United States diplomacy under Barack Obama, at least 
from a Gulf perspective,  appeared ill-thought through. By 2009, the scope and intensity of 
ties between Israel and the Gulf states had increased markedly. In March that year, during  
discussions with the Acting US Secretary for Near East Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, Hadas-
Handelsman again reported back  on discussions he has held in secret with several Gulf 
interlocutors:   
 [T]he Gulf Arabs believe in Israel’s role because of the perception of Israel’s  close 
 relationship with the U.S but also due to their sense that they can count on Israel 
 against Iran. They believe Israel can work magic….When considering a tri-lateral 
 U.S-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas[Handelman] suggested  we bear in mind that 
 Iran’s nuclear programme is the primary source of concern to the U.S and Israel, 
 while the Gulf Arabs also worry about Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons 
 (Wikileaks, 2009). 
 
 The Israeli  diplomat conceded that progress on the Palestinian track would help ease 
a more public engagement with the Jewish state across the Gulf but Hadas-Handelman  
pushed the line that  progress, while  desirable, “[s]hould not be the sum total of Israel’s 
relations with the Arab world”  upon which everything else was contingent.  Israel was 
therefore content for relations to remain at least partially veiled because the price to be paid 
for the security benefits  to be  gained could be purchased  for very little  domestic political 
cost: in short,  pressure to compromise with the Palestinians and the inevitable backlash from  
right wing and religious-nationalists this would inevitably draw was largely removed from 
the diplomatic equation (Inbari, 2012, pp.130-150). Instead, Israel could in practice 
compartmentalize its relations with particular Gulf states precisely because, as Hadas-
Handelman noted,  the shared fears over Iranian regional designs created a hierarchy of 
values  within the TSR that trumped any immediate  desire among the Gulf states to push the 
Arab peace initiative.  
  The gains Israel  accrued in the capitals of the Arab Gulf however  were seemingly 
put at risk  for short term tactical gain when, in the spring of 2010, Israeli intelligence officers 
were believed to have carried out the assassination of the Hamas security chief, Mahmoud al-
Mabhouh, in a Dubai hotel  (Raviv & Melman, 2012, pp.302-308). But while the killing was 
met with almost ritual condemnation across the region and indeed much of Europe, such 
reaction was almost choreographed for domestic consumption. In as much as there can be  
diplomatic  fall-out  between  states who have no official ties, it was surprisingly short-lived.  
This  validates  a defining elements of  the TSR: A recognition and acceptance that  while it 
does not  inhibit actors towards a particular type of action, the regime does mitigate friction 
resulting from such acts. Furthermore,  it allows cooperation in other realms to develop and 
continue. 
 One such realm is the Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC) based in 
Muscat.  An organization that has set out to realize an epistemic community dedicated to 
addressing water scarcity  across the Middle East, the MEDRC was established in 1996 as a 
direct result of the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords.  Even though Muscat had 
forced the closure of the Israeli trade mission in 2000, the continued  participation of Israeli 
scientists has remained integral to the Research Centre, allowing in the process Israeli 
diplomats to meet with their Omani and Qatari counterparts under the auspices of the 
Centre’s collaborative ventures (Ravid, 2009b). More recently, through the offices of another 
such IGO, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) based in the UAE ,  Israel 
has been able to open a bureau  in Abu Dhabi  staffed by three diplomats,  a sure sign that any 
lingering enmity  towards Jerusalem following the al-Mabhouh affair has long since abated. 
(Shazaf & Donaghy, 2016). Such ventures a validate a wider point of our  framework: that 
while configured around the maintenance  primarily of a “strategic good,” the TSR defined 
here can and does encompass other modes of official exchange between the actors involved 
that  can push back against the wider  ideational  constraints.  
 Underpinning such ties with the UAE has been a concomitant increase in trade and 
other commercial ties, an important component of  TSR that highlight co-operation in other 
realms. The Israeli Bureau of Statistics disclosed that in 2013 alone, Jerusalem exported some 
$5.3 million worth of goods and services to the UAE, although most  informed observers 
believe that the total was much higher because of the use of made of companies in third 
countries, most notably Jordan.  One study has suggested that from 2003-2011, trade with the 
GCC states amounted to over $500 million annually (Gal, 2012). Notable in this regard has 
been Israeli involvement in the sale of the “‘Falcon Eye” surveillance system  as well as 
advanced cyber – security software purchased from Israel by the Emiratis in 2015 (Shezaf & 
Donaghy, 2016; Bergman, 2016). 
 The comparative advantage Israel enjoys in the fields of security and intelligence is 
one that has a clear appeal for some of the  dynastic monarchies who, while acknowledging 
the need for domestic reform, remained  keen to mitigate  any wider undercurrents of internal  
social unrest. Even before the Arab uprisings, Israel had developed links with Bahrain 
through the Mossad.  Such were the intimacy  of  such contacts that the Bahraini monarch, 
Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa instructed officials in Manama to refrain from reference to the 
“Zionist entity” or the “enemy,” derogatory nomenclature used to refer to Israel more widely 
across the Arab world (Melman, 2011; Wasser, 2013). 
Evidence too exists that this wider acceptance (though not embrace of Jews and 
Israel) has a wider traction across the region. As the eighth annual Arab Youth Survey  
highlighted most clearly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ranked only seventh when young 
Arabs were asked to identify the biggest challenges now facing the Middle East with Israel 
only eliciting a mention by name  on just two occasions (Arab Youth Survey, 2016). At the 
very least, such sentiment portends wider Gulf Arab acceptance of  elite dialogue, an 
important variable as noted in our framework  in legitimizing a more  substantive exchange 
of both political and strategic  goods between the regime actors. As  important as such ties 
and indeed sentiments  are to Jerusalem however, their level and intensity is ultimately 
contingent on the position of Saudi Arabia and the extent to which Riyadh has been willing to 
confront its own  Wahhabi religious establishment – which has  long  regarded  Israel as an 
apostasy – in its effort to construct a broader front against Tehran.   
 
Israel and Saudi Arabia 
 As the key actors in the evolution of  the TSR, both Israel and Saudi Arabia have 
embraced  not just the “unwritten” and “uncodified” of Klieman’s definition, but  
increasingly the more open if subtle signals between key actors whose importance is more 
than just the symbolism of the act: rather, as noted in our framework, the regime has 
engendered over time a  public acceptance of more open, even  substantive exchange of 
strategic and political goods, thereby  allowing  the regime to change and adapt as ideational 
context dictates.  
Over the last five years,  influential Saudis have certainly  come to be more  open in 
their dealings with Israel,  approaches  that have been noteworthy for the absence of any 
rancor. Prince Turki al-Faisal-al Saud, former head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence 
Directorate for 24 years and later on, ambassador to both the court of St James and 
Washington  used  an interview with  the Financial Times in March 2014 to acknowledge 
Israel’s intelligence services as  “[T]he most professional, although they’ve committed a lots 
of mistakes. But they do accomplish their missions.” (Luce, 2014) Just two months later, in 
an event hosted in Brussels by the German Marshall Fund, the Saudi  shared a platform with 
the former head of Israeli military intelligence and  current director of the Institute for 
National Security Studies, Major General Amos Yadlin, primarily to discuss the Arab Peace 
Initiative.  The importance of the event was in its political symbolism  as it was streamed live 
to a global audience, breaking a long held taboo that any Saudi, let alone one identified so 
closely with the ruling family, could ever appear in public with their erstwhile foe. While 
Prince Turki continued to champion the Arab Peace Initiative  and with it, tangible progress 
to be made on issues related to refugees, borders and the status of Jerusalem, his appearance 
was actually of a piece with a discernible if low-key Saudi ‘intellectual’ engagement with 
Israel that eschewed the crude stereotype and epithets of previous years. For example, 
another senior member of the ruling dynasty, Brigadier-General Naef Bin Ahmed al-Saud, 
published a detailed appreciation of  the challenges – social, political and security related – 
now facing the Jewish State. Of particular note in his essay was its thinly veiled support for 
Israel’s  response to pro-Palestinian  activists trying to break the siege of the Gaza. Drawing 
parallels with the decision of Riyadh to  offer military support to the Al-Khalifa regime in 
Bahrain, al-Saud noted that, “When foreigners aim to influence events under  a particular 
nation’s control, whether by social media or otherwise, that nation may take it upon itself to 
expel or repel such foreigners.” (Ahmed al-Saud, 2012; Oren, 2012) 
 For the Saudis, the events that led to their intervention in Bahrain were less an 
expression of the majority Shi’ite population demanding greater political and social rights, 
and more  the manifestation of Iranian meddling among their co-religionists to further their 
wider regional designs. Such perceptions informed their view of Tehran’s nuclear program 
with the fear that its apogee would be realized in the establishment of Iran as the  dominant 
hegemon throughout the Gulf. According to a leaked diplomatic cable , it was for this reason 
alone that the late Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, urged  Washington. DC in 2010 to sever 
the head of the “Iranian snake” ( “US Embassy cables,” 2010).  The advent of the Arab 
Uprisings and with it, the fragmentation of many of the old Republican autocracies  into their 
many sectarian and religious parts,  served to fuel the perception of Iran’s malfeasance and in 
turn,  determined  a more pro-active Saudi policy across the region. While this has come to be 
realized in Riyadh’s support for a range of non-state armed groups fighting both the Islamic 
State (also known as Daesh) and Iranian sponsored proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen,  from 
2009 the Saudis began to openly align their concerns over the Iranian nuclear with those of 
Israel (Ben Yishai, 2015). 
 This synergy was apparent in the warm accolades accorded Binyamin Netanyahu in 
some Saudi media outlets following his speech before the United States Congress on 3 March 
2015. While conceding there was much that still divided Israel from the Arab world,  Faisal 
Abbas, a senior journalist with  al-Arabiya, a Saudi owned news channel wrote that 
irrespective of such differences  “one must admit, Bibi did get it right, at least when it came 
to dealing with Iran.” (“Netanyahu’s Congress speech,” 2015) It was an open 
acknowledgment that  Netanyahu’s consistent public opposition to any agreement that left 
Iran in possession of a viable nuclear breakout capability enjoyed Riyadh’s affirmation, and 
was very much in line with the belief  expressed by Hadas-Handelsman that because of the 
perceived leverage that Jerusalem could exercise across Washington, it was in effect doing 
the diplomatic  bidding for  the Gulf states.   
  This was a vocal expression of core elements of the TSR typology  outlined: The 
containment of Iran as a regional threat; that shared subjective perception surrounding the 
position of the United States; and that  clear  signals regarding the position taken by one party 
to the regime –  in this case Israel – enjoyed the support of  other actors. Of course, antipathy 
towards Israel remains strong  among influential Saudis (Friedman, 2015). At the end of 
2015, the most senior cleric in the Kingdom, Shaykh Abdulaziz al-Shaykh  even stated that 
the so called “Islamic  state” was in reality an adjunct of the Israeli army. While clearly 
removed from any meaningful reality, such statements are indicative that the scope and 
intensity of even a tacit relationship has finite boundaries (Riedel, 2015; “Saudi Arabia 
denies,” 2014). 
 The broader question however is that having failed to scupper the Iran deal in 
Congress, has this convinced  the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia included, that Israel’s influence in 
Washington, DC is less than its supposed many parts? The answer for now can be given in 
the negative, not least because both Israel and the Gulf states continue to share a malign view 
of Iranian influence throughout the region that remains at the evolutionary core of the TSR. 
For example, Israeli coverage of the war in Yemen invariably ascribes the success of the 
Houthi tribal militias to the support of Tehran and has evinced little criticism over the 
conduct of  the Saudi led air campaign that has yet to achieve any real tangible military or 
political gains for its ousted surrogate, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Ziv, 2015; 
Bergman & Stark, 2015; Friedman, 2016b). Equally, the reluctance  of the  Obama 
Administration  to offer more forthright leadership  across the region helped nurture and 
sustain a mutual acceptance “towards particular types of action”  as part of the evolving 
nature of TSR. This suggests that in light of Washington, DC’s apparent retrenchment, the 
symbiotic nature of the TSR, not least in the field of public and  “soft” diplomacy outlined 
will likely endure. The evidence  for this, both tangible and inferred, is persuasive.   
 In December 2015, the former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Dore 
Gold, disclosed to the Saudi news website Elaph, at the end of 2015 that Israel had prevented 
SA-22 anti-aircraft missiles reaching the hand of Hezbollah, and concluded  his interview by 
noting that
 
We [Israel and the Gulf States] have common interests regarding the Iranian threat, 
 not only Tehran’s nuclear programme, but also Iran’s activities on the ground, and its 
 repeated attempts to use the Shiite sect in the Arab world, to make them a fifth 
 column among those states. (Kas, 2015)  
 
Gold had already made headlines that summer when, on the eve of assuming his 
appointment he had shared the stage with former Saudi General Anwar Eshki in an event 
organized under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. The 
Saudi remained keen to promote the API as the basis of a wider regional agreement as part of 
the discussions; most notable however, was  the very public accord  reached by both men that 
Iran remained the root  cause of instability across much of the Middle East and a threat to 
their respective interests (“In a very rare public meet,” 2015).  
 With the threat of  social unrest across the Arab street still a source of deep concern 
for Riyadh, measures have been taken to alleviate the economic distress that underpins such 
popular resentment while enhancing security co-operation. In the case of Egypt, this included 
the announcement that Saudi Arabia would construct a bridge linking the Saudi mainland 
with the Sinai peninsula, a deal which saw sovereign control of the tiny islands of Tiran and 
Sanifir pass over to Riyadh.  In 1967, Israeli sensitivities over access to the Red Sea through 
the  Straits of Tiran  presaged the Six Day War.  Evidence exists however that Cairo notified 
Jerusalem of its intent to relinquish control of the islands, a conversation   likely to have been 
coordinated with Riyadh. The Saudi Foreign Minister,  Adel al-Jubeir, was quick to insist that 
the deal was struck “‘without having a relationship or communication with Israel,”;  but the 
strategic sensitivities involved could hardly have seen an agreement reached without (our 
emphasis) Israeli diplomatic benediction being conferred, however discreet, upon the deal 
(Al-Din, 2016; Cohen, 2016; Barel, 2016). It is perhaps the most tangible manifestation to 
date of wider interests  and shared perceptions of threat that  define  the mediating role of the  
TSR between Israel and the Gulf states in realizing shared political and strategic interests 
which in this case, included shoring up the regime of Egyptian president Abd al-Fattah al-
Sisi.  
Other common interests  extend over how to deal with  the  Hezbollah, now regarded 
by most member states of the Arab League as a terrorist organisation following a vote by the 
organisation to label the Lebanese Shi’a organisation as such in February 2016. There is 
evidence too that popular Saudi opinion has fallen in behind that of the regime regarding Iran 
and its surrogates. A  quite unique telephone opinion poll conducted among the 
Interdisciplinary Centre  (IDC) in Herziliya, Israel in the summer of 2015 found that of the 
506 surveyed, 53% thought Iran to be the primary  threat to the security of the Kingdom, with 
only 18% citing Jerusalem. As Dr Alex Mintz  who oversaw the IDC survey noted, “What we 
think here in Israel about the Saudis is not exactly what they are. There is a great identity of 
interests and threats and agendas … some would even like to join forces with Israel.” (Times 
of Israel, 2016)  
 Such steps are of course unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future.  In public at 
least, Saudi officials continue to make clear that until or unless Israel is willing to engage 
seriously with the API and with it, tangible progress towards realizing Palestinian self-
determination,  overt ties with Jerusalem will hardly move beyond the symbolic handshakes 
at academic symposia (Ravid, 2016c). Netanyahu too  remains hamstrung, politically as well 
as ideologically by a domestic constituency unwilling to accept substantive territorial 
concessions to the Palestinians; over Syria too, Israel  and Saudi Arabia hold divergent views.  
(Inbari 2012) The shared animus towards Hizbollah apart , it is not at all clear that Israel 
wishes to see the removal of al-Asad (or at least his wider regime), a position at odds with the 
support given by Saudi Arabia to a plethora of armed Sunni groups.  
It is a reality that is understood well by both Saudis and Israelis and  accepted  as such 
in the wider context of the shared antipathies towards Tehran but  does not preclude, as part 
of the TSR, competition or divergent interests in other fields. Israel for example, voiced its 
objection to the sale by Washington, DC of  advanced weapons systems to the Gulf states in 
the aftermath of the Iran nuclear deal, Jerusalem fearing that such sales threatened its  
qualitative  military edge over its neighbors (Ravid, 2016d). For all concerned, the nascent 
character  of the TSR between Israel and the Gulf states  has been shaped by its lowest 
common denominator, the perceived threat from Tehran, while sidestepping perhaps the more 
intractable issue of Palestinian statehood (Maddy-Weitzmann, 2016). Other areas of co-
operation and collaboration do of course exist, the MEDRC being the most notable example. 
Still, whether overtime the contours of a TSR can foster the confidence building measures 
that will be required to reach a formal  diplomatic treaty satisfactory to all sides will, in truth, 
be the real test of its leverage beyond the immediate purchase of hard security. For now, all 
concerned remain the best of adversaries.  
 
Conclusion 
The logic of the security dilemma would suggest that at the very least, a formal 
alliance between Israel and the Gulf states, conditioned by a shared  view of Iranian regional 
intrigue would most likely emerge. That it has failed to do so speaks volumes for the 
continued hold that the divisive issue of Palestine continues to exercise over the collective 
Arab conscience as well as internal Israeli political discourse (Al-Faisal & Amidror, 2016). 
For now however Israeli policy makers believe that the loose institutional framework of the 
TSR has allowed the individual  members to calibrate the level and intensity of ties with 
Jerusalem, an arrangement favored by Israel but with a recognition that Riyadh holds the 
whip hand. It may also reflect a continuity of Jerusalem’s  attitude toward peace in which it 
has demonstrated a  continued preference for  conducting  bilateral negotiations. Still, 
improved relations and the benefits that may accrue from such ties remain contingent upon 
inter-Arab relations, internal GCC politics and progress being made in the Israeli-Palestinians 
negotiations (Levy & Eichner, 2016; Ravid, 2016e). When coupled with the widely held 
perception that Washington, DC’s military and diplomatic leverage across the region is much 
diminished, a  view unlikely to have been disabused by President Obama’s reflections on the 
trajectory of United States foreign policy under his tenure, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
shared perceptions of threat have led to increased ties (and open dialogue) between erstwhile 
foes (Goldberg, 2016). Any attempt, however to force such relations  into the limelight would 
undermine what has been achieved so far. Even so, there is a wide range of policy options 
between full diplomatic relations and a total lack of contact, and the  actors involved can and 
indeed have taken full advantage of this. Israelis in particular remain keen to highlight the 
shared interests between Jerusalem and what Major General Herzi Halevy, the serving Head 
of Israeli military intelligence, has referred to as the “pragmatic Sunni countries” (“Israeli 
official praises Saudi King,” 2016). 
Our  six defining elements of the TSR  that have  emerged between Israel and the 
Gulf  states  span a range of activities but recognize ultimately  that hard security determines 
the level of engagement. It recognizes too that internal constraints on all sides determine the 
type and intensity  of external engagement, a conceptual observation that  challenges a purely 
realist account of  regional power politics devoid of ideational content: There  is also a 
realization that amid the upheaval and fragmentation of much of the Middle East, state based 
interests still matter and the interests of Jerusalem and Riyadh in this instance perhaps matter 
the most. Geographical proximity has never been an issue and nor has the multilateral nature 
of ties between Israel and the Gulf states, precisely because Riyadh’s dominance of Gulf 
security has largely filtered  the level of engagement with Israel.   
 For now, the level and intensity of the ties  established  relate primarily to Iran; but  if 
the view holds that Washington, DC’s diplomatic  and military footprint among  erstwhile 
protagonists faced with a wider regional challenge has become increasingly feint,  the TSR 
emerging between Israel and the Gulf states might well provide a template for understanding 
shifts in alliance patterns  across the  wider region. Such patterns of engagement are already 
discernible in Israel’s ties with Russia as both parties seek to avoid misunderstandings over  
Lebanon and Syria while pursuing national security objectives clearly  at variance (Barel, 
2017). At a time when state sovereignty and legitimacy are increasingly framed by sectarian 
identities and religious affiliation, the very idea of the TSR or variants thereof will now  
likely define  the modes and means of diplomatic exchange across the Middle East as the 
regions states continue to chase its most precious yet elusive of  prizes: security itself.   
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